Introduction
Overlapping regimes create problems of management at international and national levels. Recent work by Orsini (2013a, 2013b) This study explores the co-evolution of regime complexes and national policy coherence in the context of biodiversity governance. It focusses on the cluster of biodiversity-related multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs) (see Table 1 ) and their implementation in countries of Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC). Observers have noticed that co-ordination in the biodiversity cluster is stronger than co-ordination of implementation activities at the national level (see Jardin, 2010; Jóhannsdóttir et al. 2010) . However, the nature and extent of that gap has not been examined, and its analysis appears particularly important in light of the international community's failure to achieve the global target of significantly reducing the rate of biodiversity loss by 2010 (the socalled 2010 Biodiversity Target).
The co-evolution of regime complexes and national policy coherence requires horizontal and vertical interaction. Accordingly, this study asks two questions: 1) how different are the horizontal linkages created in the biodiversity cluster from those emerging at the level of national implementation? 2) how do vertical linkages enable the co-evolution of the biodiversity cluster and national biodiversity policy? Synergies in the biodiversity cluster have been the subject of recent attention in the literature (e.g. UNEP-WCMC, 2012; Baakman, 2011; Caddell, 2011; Simon, 2011; Jóhannsdóttir et al. 2010; Jardin, 2010; Andresen and Rosendal, 2009; Urho, 2009) . Conversely, synergies among biodiversity regimes at the national level have mostly been examined in the context of The paper proceeds as follows. The next section discusses the coevolution of regime complexes and policy coherence within the empirical area of focus. A third section examines the management of biodiversity-related conventions in LAC countries in the light of the co-evolution thesis. Discussion of findings and concluding remarks close the paper.
governance (cross-level interplay). Morin and Orsini (2013a) conceive of policy coherence as a problem of foreign policy, but not yet as a problem of public policy arising from the implementation of overlapping commitments. Coherence is an ambiguous concept which is equated with and/or differentiated from other concepts such as consistency, compatibility and complementarity (see e.g. Höpner, 2005; Gauttier, 2004; Streeck, 2004) . In this paper coherence is associated with complementarity of action (mutual reinforcement) and is distinguished from consistency or compatibility of action (absence of contradiction) (see also Jones, 2002) . From a public policy perspective, coherence can be examined as a process (focussing on upstream policy-making procedures and associated institutional arrangements), an output (exploring policy objectives and associated implementation arrangements), or an outcome (assessing behavioural changes and impacts on the target of governance) (Nilsson et al. 2012) . In a regime complexity context, these three aspects can be related to the density of the regime complex (upstream policy processes), the coherency of national policies and implementation arrangements (policy outputs), and the cohesiveness and effectiveness of governance as a whole (outcomes and impacts).
Under a conventional policy-analytical framework, policy outputs should be in line with policy processes to achieve coherent governance. In contrast, from a co-evolutionary perspective, policy processes and outputs influence each other and should advance in complementary ways for purposes of coherent governance. Thus, the co-evolution of regime complexes and national McGraw, 2002) . Figure 1 illustrates the structure of the complex as arising from the formal agreements between its constituent conventions.
The governing bodies of the biodiversity-related conventions have made regular calls for states to improve synergies in national implementation (see UNEP-WCMC, 2012) , and have delegated inter-treaty co-operation tasks to treaty secretariats (Urho, 2009) . Global co-ordination is assisted by various overarching organisations such as the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) and the International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN), both of which also support domestic efforts to enhance integration of biodiversityrelated MEAs (see Andresen and Rosendal, 2009; Urho, 2009 ). The biodiversity cluster has achieved partial integration in a number of areas. Examples include the joint preparation and/or endorsement of technical guidance, standardisation of taxonomy and nomenclature, joint field missions and projects, and joint capacity-building activities (see Jardin, 2010) . While areas of substantive overlap remain under-exploited (see Ministry of the Environment of Finland, 2010) , it is at the national level where co-ordination problems appear particularly acute (see Jardin, 2010; Masundire, 2006) .
Problems of coherence in biodiversity governance became salient in the context of efforts to achieve the 2010 Biodiversity Target, adopted at the sixth meeting of the Conference of the Parties (CoP) to the CBD (The Hague, Netherlands, 7-19 April 2002) . The Target was endorsed by world leaders at the Rockström et al. 2009 ). Understanding problems of coherent governance is of utmost importance as the international community makes renewed efforts to address the biodiversity crisis through the new Aichi
Biodiversity Targets established at CBD CoP10 (Nagoya, Japan, 18-29 October 2010).
To address problems of coherence in areas of regime overlap, it is necessary to examine whether, and to what extent, regime complexes and national policy coherence co-evolve. In other words, a focus on coherent governance as a process becomes imperative. In European Union (EU) studies, coherent governance as a process has two dimensions: a horizontal one concerning interactions at the same level of social organisation; and a vertical one relating to cross-level interactions (Portela and Raube, 2008) . The coevolution of regime complexes and policy coherence (coherent governance as a process) is thus based on horizontal and vertical integration. Consequently, the degree to which co-evolution occurs can be established by 1) comparing horizontal management processes (horizontal integration); and 2) exploring vertical linkages between them (vertical integration). These two elements are next discussed in relation to the empirical area of focus.
Horizontal integration
To establish whether, and to what extent, regime complexes and national policy coherency display similar evolution patterns, criteria of comparison need to be defined. Achieving integration in a regime complex and coherence in the implementation of its elemental regimes requires interplay management.
Interplay management are deliberate efforts to improve regime interplay and its effects (Oberthür, 2009) . The literature has examined interplay management along different dimensions, including the goals and modes of management (see Stokke and Oberthür, 2011) . These categories can be used to examine the management of biodiversity-related conventions at global and national levels.
Available information from the literature is nonetheless insufficient for a critical comparison: while there is a general understanding of co-operation activities in the biodiversity cluster, synergies at the level of national implementation are not well known (studies examining co-ordination in MEA implementation have not examined specific developments within the ambit of the conventions of the biodiversity cluster, and, in many cases, are outdated). The ensuing discussion thus focusses on horizontal integration in the biodiversity cluster, making some empirical observations on regime inter-linkages at the national level. Synergies at global and national levels are later on compared building on the analysis of national experiences in LAC countries.
Policy goals and objectives
The management of regime interplay may be geared towards goals such as avoiding conflict, enhancing synergy, achieving efficiency, and promoting justice and equity (Oberthür, 2009) . Those goals may be pro-actively pursued or arise in response to specific cases of interaction (Stokke, 2009; Gehring and Oberthür, 2006) . Improving synergistic interplay is the main goal of interplay management in the biodiversity cluster. The Liaison Group of Biodiversity- Inter-linkages in national implementation often lack strategic direction.
Lack of co-ordination is a recurrent theme in studies looking at synergies in the national implementation of MEAs. Co-ordination sometimes exists at the project level, but not at the political and institutional levels (Chasek, 2010; Van Toen, 2001 ).
Institutional and implementation arrangements
Modes of interplay management range from hierarchical control to coordination through markets and networks (Stokke and Oberthür, 2011; Oberthür, 2009; Provan and Kenis, 2008) . Interplay management in the biodiversity cluster involves decentralised political co-ordination. While various overarching organisations support synergy processes in the cluster (see Andresen and Rosendal, 2009) Problems of inter-agency co-ordination, however, sometimes prevent this. Van
Toen (2001) observed that ministries of foreign affairs in countries of the Asia Pacific region often failed to involve national focal points in negotiations over plans to be implemented at the national level.
Synergies in national implementation develop more informally. In many countries there are no mechanisms promoting joint actions among MEA officers (Mouat et al. 2006) . However, some African countries (e.g. Guinea Bissau and Kenya) have established reference groups, which are intended to support the work of national focal points and focal institutions for some conventions (Masundire, 2006) . Overlap of experts involved in these reference groups allow the emergence of informal networks of MEA officers where opportunities for synergy arise (ibid.).
Vertical integration
Vertical linkages between governance levels should flow both in a topdown and bottom-up direction (Karlsson-Vinkhuyzen, 2012) . Top-down approaches may appear illegitimate and irrelevant to everyday lives, whereas bottom-up management may prioritise short-term national goals at the expense of long-term global concerns (ibid.). Studies examining synergies in the biodiversity cluster have thrown light on the different pathways through which global governance seeks to influence national implementation. Nevertheless, both the way in which these pathways affect domestic behaviours and the avenues through which national actors seek to affect governance in the biodiversity cluster are difficult to assess from the available information. In what follows, two scholarly works are discussed that provide a basis for exploring how global and national governance influence each other. The frameworks are applied, where possible, to the biodiversity case. The paper returns to these frameworks when domestic synergy processes in LAC countries are examined.
Top-down pathways of influence
Bernstein and Cashore (2012) identify four different pathways through which global governance arrangements can influence national policy:
1.
International rules, including the binding obligations contained in treaty texts and the policy prescriptions of powerful international organisations.
2.
International norms and discourse setting general standards of behaviour of non-binding character.
3.
Markets, which can be created or intervened to alter incentive structures.
4.
Direct access to domestic-policy making processes in the form of education, training, assistance, capacity-building and/or cogovernance via partnerships.
International rules have marginal relevance as a means of promoting synergies in the implementation of biodiversity-related conventions. The texts of the conventions of the biodiversity cluster do not create obligations to achieve synergy in their implementation (Caddell, 2011) . In contrast, several resolutions and decisions (soft-law norms) have encouraged countries to co-ordinate activities pursuant to different biodiversity-related agreements. Markets have been used marginally to foster synergies on the ground due to the fragmentation of existing financial mechanisms. However, UNEP and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) are implementing agencies of biodiversity-related projects financed by the Global Environment Facility (GEF) and can influence the way in which external resources are used to achieve global biodiversity goals (see Andresen and Rosendal, 2009) . Direct support to domestic synergies has come through capacity-building activities, including joint field missions and projects (Jardin, 2010) .
Bottom-up pathways of influence
In a recent study, Goodwin (2013) Research on bottom-up influence on governance arrangements in the biodiversity cluster is nonetheless poor.
The biodiversity-related conventions and their implementation in LAC countries
This section examines inter-linkages in the implementation of the biodiversity-related conventions in LAC countries with a view to exploring whether, and to what extent, the biodiversity cluster and national biodiversity policies in the region have co-evolved. Following a description of the research methods, the horizontal and vertical aspects of national management processes are discussed as informed by the theoretical framework presented in the previous section.
The case study
LAC was selected as the focal region in which to explore synergies among biodiversity-related conventions because it is considered one of the most biologically diverse regions in the world ( These (25) states were then ranked according to their wealth of biological diversity (as measured by the GEF Benefits Index for Biodiversity) (see Table   2 ). The primary national focal points of the CBD in the first 15 countries of the sample were contacted to arrange interviews. This was possible in all countries but Venezuela. To stay within the 15-country target, contact was successfully made with CBD authorities in Jamaica (the sixteenth country of the sample).
A total of eighteen interviews with CBD officials (most of them technical focal points) were conducted between December 2011 and April 2012. Of these, fifteen were audio interviews and three were questionnaire-based. Audio interviews were recorded and transcribed.
Matrix analysis was used to examine interview transcripts. Matrix analysis is a distinct type of thematic analysis where units of analysis (e.g. individuals and groups) are tabulated against concepts or issues relevant to the research questions (King and Horrocks, 2010) . The framework for the analysis of regime complexes and national policy coherence (presented in section 2), which incorporates two main elements (horizontal and vertical integration) associated with the two research questions, was the basis for creating an analytical matrix. Interview transcripts were tabulated against it.
Limitations of the methodological approach need to be acknowledged.
The analysis of national experiences relies heavily on subjective accounts and is not based on a systematic review of management processes. As a result, comparisons between countries are difficult to make. Indeed, the analysis focussed on identifying general trends and challenges rather than on delving into specific national circumstances. In some countries, the co-evolution of international and national biodiversity policies displays characteristics that deviate from the regional trends, but this is not assessed here. For purposes of confidentiality, the names and positions of interviewed CBD authorities are kept anonymous and only linked to the country they represent. In cases where two participants were from the same country, they are distinguished by letters A and B.
Horizontal integration
Implementation of the biodiversity-related conventions in LAC countries has advanced through separate processes rather than in an integrated manner.
Implementation of all treaties requires adjustments in existing institutional frameworks: "it is a process which develops in incremental steps; progress is swift in some cases, but not in others" (Argentinian Interviewee). Countries On-going co-ordination processes are examined next along the interplay management dimensions discussed in section 2. Comparisons with global interlinkages established in the biodiversity cluster are made.
Policy goals and objectives
The strategic plans and/or programmes of the conventions of the biodiversity cluster contain provisions on co-operation with other biodiversity- Table 3 ).
In the biodiversity cluster, a number of thematic mechanisms (e.g. InterAgency Liaison Group on Invasive Alien Species) and joint initiatives in areas of regime overlap (e.g. sustainable use, environmental impact assessment and site-based conservation) enable co-ordinated work (UNEP-WCMC, 2012).
Thematic co-operation is also common at the level of national implementation. (Jamaican Interviewee A). The strategy features three objectives in the area of international co-operation, one of which is to create synergies in the implementation of international environmental agreements adopted by the country. In section XVI of the strategy, Argentina commits to implementing international environmental agreements and enhancing the country's capacity to participate in international environmental fora.
Explicit references to implementation of biodiversity-related MEAs other than the CBD

Bolivia Estrategia Nacional de Biodiversidad 2001
One of the priorities of the strategy is to improve implementation of international environmental agreements, in particular, the CBD, the Climate Change Convention, the Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention, CITES and the Ramsar Convention.
Cuba Estrategia Nacional para la Diversidad Biológica y Plan de Acción en la República de Cuba 1999
One of the goals of the strategy is to strengthen international co-operation, including through an active involvement in the implementation of the CBD and other related instruments.
Inter-linkages between biodiversity-related MEAs have also been there has been collaboration on awareness raising workshops.
Institutional and implementation arrangements
Synergies in the biodiversity cluster result from decentralised coordination. Overarching organisations, most notably UNEP, support inter-treaty co-operation but have no legal mandate to pursue centralised management.
Decentralised co-ordination is also prevalent at the national level. In countries where various conventions fall under the roof of the same agency (the Costa Rican National System of Conservation Areas, for example, was reported to oversee eight biodiversity-related MEAs at the time when the interviews were conducted), some centralised planning can be expected. Nevertheless, the conventions of the biodiversity cluster are usually administered by different ministries and/or agencies. The national focal points to the CBD, the Ramsar Convention, CITES and the CMS are generally based in environmental ministries and/or agencies, whereas WHC and ITPGRFA authorities are housed by non-environmental ministries. Synergies arise in the context of mechanisms for sectoral and inter-ministerial co-ordination, but not through centralised planning.
Co-operation in the biodiversity cluster unfolds within a core governance network comprising the six conventions and other overarching organisations;
and within a number of peripheral networks where interaction with regimes in other policy areas takes place. The core network has its most visible expression in the BLG and the CSAB but is also based on formal mechanisms for cooperation such as MoUs/MoCs and joint work programmes. At the national level, the core governance network becomes blurred. This is because many LAC countries have a loose conception of biodiversity-related agreements which extends beyond the boundaries of the biodiversity cluster, encompassing for example the climate change and desertification conventions. An Ecuadorian interviewee even considered that "when we talk about synergies, we talk about co-ordination among MEAs in general".
It is mainly within peripheral networks that national-level synergies among biodiversity-related conventions emerge. In some countries, interinstitutional committees have been established to oversee the implementation of specific conventions and to address specific issues under a co-ordinated approach. These committees resemble the global task forces and working groups promoting co-operation between biodiversity-related conventions and 
Vertical integration
Global governance has influenced the management of biodiversityrelated conventions in LAC countries. In contrast, national governance has not actively shaped regime interplay in the biodiversity cluster. Top-down and bottom-up pathways of influence are discussed below.
Top-down pathways of influence
Global influence on national implementation has come less from normative means (international norms and discourse) than from utilitarian and cognitive instruments (markets and direct access to domestic policy-making).
International norms and discourse are a main mechanism for influencing MEA inter-linkages were purposefully addressed (see Table 3 ).
Influence along the markets pathway relates primarily to the financial incentives created by the GEF. The GEF is the largest public funder of projects to protect the global environment (GEF, 2013) . It funds the additional costs "associated with transforming a project with national benefits into one with global environmental benefits" (ibid.), with biodiversity being one of its main focal areas. This funding approach makes project proposals addressing synergies between biodiversity-related MEAs more appealing than issue- 
Discussion: The co-evolution of the biodiversity cluster and national biodiversity policy
The paper now returns to the two questions guiding this research. First, the study asked whether global and national arrangements for the implementation of biodiversity-related conventions display similar evolution patterns. Observers have noticed a gap between global and national integration (Jardin, 2010; Masundire, 2006) , but have fallen short of exploring the nature and extent of the gap. This study made an empirical comparison of horizontal integration processes revealing that inter-treaty co-operation does display a more advanced development both in terms of the goals pursued and the means for their achievement.
Synergies at both levels of governance usually arise in connection with specific issues and themes. However, while co-operation in the biodiversity cluster is often a pro-active exercise intended to synergise implementation activities, co-ordination among national focal points appears to emerge in response to particular needs. The strategic plans and programmes of the biodiversity-related conventions acknowledge the importance of synergies in the biodiversity cluster (UNEP-WCMC, 2012). While co-operation might have evolved haphazardly (Urho, 2009) , there have been attempts at joint implementation through the adoption of common technical guidance, the standardisation of nomenclature, and joint capacity-building. This has not occurred at the national level, where synergies in policy frameworks are absent or left implicit at best. As is the case in the Pacific Islands (see Chasek, 2010) , national focal points co-operate in relation to specific projects, but not at more programmatic and strategic levels.
Network governance forms are a preferred avenue to co-ordinate implementation activities. Only at the international level, however, has a core network of biodiversity-related agreements emerged. This network is based on mechanisms, when carefully designed, can be effective instruments to align international and national agendas (see Leplay and Thoyer, 2011) .
The modest influence of global governance on domestic policy suggests that synergies in LAC countries have been mostly driven by national processes.
Such an inward-looking approach is reflected in a low profile involvement in international biodiversity governance. The empirical evidence suggests that most LAC countries do not take an active stance in promoting greater integration in the biodiversity cluster as they prepare and participate in meetings of the biodiversity-related conventions. This might be because countries have derived little benefit from inter-treaty co-operation, but also because they might be wary about raising the profile of biodiversity conservation in the international agenda at the expense of, for example, economic development (Jinnah (2011) has noticed that developing country parties to the CBD do not usually consider biodiversity conservation a priority). Greater engagement with synergy processes in the biodiversity cluster is nonetheless important to re-orient intertreaty co-operation towards providing increased support to national implementation in line with countries' interests.
Overall, vertical linkages between global and national governance in areas where the mandates of the biodiversity-related conventions overlap appear under-developed. This prevents governance systems from interacting in complementary ways and sustains the gap between global and national implementation. Orsini (2013a, 2013b) coherence is particularly needed. It remains unclear, however, whether the momentum created at CBD CoP10 in response to the failure to achieve the 2010 Biodiversity Target will be maintained throughout the decade to advance more coherent biodiversity governance.
Concluding remarks
